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THE FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST ACT OF 1890.*
MONOPOLY.
A monopoly exists where all the selling or buying in a par-
ticular commodity is in the hands of an individual or combina-
tion of individuals. Monopolies are of several kinds considered
with respect to their origin, and the principles of the common
law applicable vary accordingly.
A monopoly may arise (i) by individual effort, that is, suc-
cessful competition, which may be fair or unfair; (2) by grant
from the state, as patents, franchises, etc.; (3) by operation of
nature; (4) by accident; (5) by purchase; (6) by combination.
58
The act does not define monopoly, but provides that every
person who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize or com-
bine to monopolize shall be subject to the penalties prescribed.
If we adopt a strict construction of the act, every monopoly re-
lating to interstate trade will be unlawful. If we adopt a liberal
construction, we must distinguish between these several kinds of
monopolies, and it is most unfortunate that the statute is not
worded accordingly. The common law apparently had no objec-
tion to a monopoly per se but only to some of the means of achiev-
* Continued from the December issue, 62 UNIVRSITY OF PENNSYLVAmA
LAW REVIEW, i02.
"See 12 COLUMBIA LAW R-VIEW, 97-133, 220-25i, especially at 246-251.
(161)
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ing a monopoly. 5 9 There was no objection at common law to (I)
a monopoly achieved by successful fair competition, (2) a mono-
poly arising by accident, (3) a monopoly by grant from the state,
and there are several dicta that the act does not apply to the
case of a monopoly achieved by individual effort.0 ° Although the
common law afforded a remedy for unfair competition, there does
not seem to be anything to show that there was any objection to a
monopoly achieved by unfair competition. It seems probable'also
that if the monopoly has been achieved by an unlawful act, it
comes within the condemnation of the act as an unlawful mono-
poly and should be disposed of as a monopoly, even though the
court would have no power to prevent by injunction the unlawful
act which has been committed.
No case has been decided involving the application of the
act to any kind of a monopoly except (i) such as have their
origin in a grant by the state, (2) natural monopolies. Any case,
therefore, relating to an ordinary business is to be referred to
that part of the act condemning combinations in restraint of trade,
and will be discussed under that heading in a subsequent part of
the article.
We may first point out a principle common to natural monop-
olies and patents, both being inevitable and protected by the law.
A combination of such monopolists will be capable of corre-
spondingly greater mischief, and consequently may be looked
upon by the law with a very jealous eye, and circumscribed
within much narrower bounds than will be the case with an ordi-
nary business. In all these cases, it seems as if the greater power
enjoyed by the individual monopolist gives him less power of
combination than in the case of a merchant engaging in a busi-
ness more open to competition.
"9 Further support to this view is furnished by reference to the title in
which the word unlawful apparently only refers to restraints, but there is
room to argue that it also qualifies monopoly. See George F. Canfield, 9
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, 104.
'Jackson, J., In re Greene (1892), 52 Fed. 104 at 115, i Fed. A. T. Dec.
54 at 7o. Sanborn, J., in U. S. v. Standard Oil Co. (1909) 173 Fed. 177 at
191, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 696 at 717. Severns, J., in Darius Cole Transportation
Co. v. White Star Line (I911), 186 Fed. 63 at 70, 4 Fed. A. T. Dec. 36 at 45.
White, C. J., in Standard Oil Co. v. U. S. (1911) 221 U. S. I at 55, 31 Sup.
Ct. 50-, 55 L. Ed. 619, 4 Fed. A. T. Dec. 79 at 225.
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Monopolies arising by grant from the state are of two kinds,
patents and public service corporations, and of the latter, common
carriers are the only ones which have been considered by the
courts in connection with the application of the act, and will be
separately discussed.
NATURAL MONOPOLY.
The owner of a natural monopoly, such as a coal mine, oil
well, etc., stands in a class by himself. The law cannot condemn
his business without interfering unduly with rights of property.
The real difficulty in these cases in this country is that the state
failed to impose proper restrictions on the acquisition of the
rights in the beginning. Of course, in many of these cases, the
monopoly is more apparent than real because the owner of a
source of supply is in competition with other persons owning sim-
ilar sources of supply. If in such case the product is sold in
another state, the penalties of the act would apply if we adopt
a literal construction of the statute. No such application of the
act has been invoked. Where, however, a number of natural
monopolists combine, they may bring themselves under the pro-
visions of the statute. In several cases such a combination has
been dissolved in proceedings by the United States under Section
4 .61
"In U. S. v. Jellico Mt. Coal & Coke Co., ef al. (189), 46 Fed. 432, I
Fed. A. T. Dec. 9, 43 Fed. 898, i Fed. A. T. Dec. i, a combination between retail
dealers and mine owners was dissolved. The object of the exchange was to
fix and establish prices and exclude persons not members of the exchange
from the business. In Chesapeake & Ohio Fuel Co. v. U. S. (19o2) 115 Fed.
6IO, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 151, affirming 105 Fed. 93, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 43, a num-
ber of mine owners made an agreement with a certain corporation by which
the corporation agreed to take the entire product of the mines designed for
western shipment for a period of five years at a minimum price, but to ob-
tain all over that possible. It was held void and the defendant enjoined
from selling or shipment under the contract into any other state, and the
contract, so far as it related to interstate commerce, dissolved. See decree
105 Fed. o5, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 51. The recent case of United States v.
Reading (1912), 226 U. S. 324, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90, 57 L. Ed. go, reversing
in part 183 Fed. Rep. 247, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 866, had to do with a combina-
tion controlling the product of certain coal mines, but the court seemed to
decide the case entirely apart from the circumstance that it related to a
natural monopoly.
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PATENTS.
A patentee has a monopoly of the manufacture and sale of
the patented article, and is very much in the position of an owner
of a natural monopoly. Both control the sole source of supply of
the commodity in question. Since this right rests on an express
act of Congress, there is strong ground -to argue that the Act of
189o, even when strictly interpreted, does not apply. "'Monop-
olize' cannot be intended to be used with reference to the acquisi-
tion of exclusive rights under government concession. '62 Just,
however, as a combination of two or more owners of a
natural monopoly may incur the condemnation of the law, so a
combination of the two or more patentees may, in like imanner,
be obnoxious to the Anti-Trust Act.
3
The patentee may employ middlemen or enter into restrictive
agreements with them. He may not care to manufacture and
may give others the right to manufacture at a royalty. He may
compel the purchaser of the patented articles to enter into agree-
ments restricting the use thereof. The principles governing the
validity of any of these arrangements depend upon the proper
construction of the patent laws, and the individual rights of the
patentee, and lie outside the scope of our discussion. 4 Any
valid arrangement of this kind, however, may be made the
'Per curiam, American Biscuit Co. v. Klotz (i8gx), 44 Fed. 721 at 724;
I Fed. A. T. Dec. 2 at 7.
" Of course, a patentee may dispose of his product and yet not be en-
gaged in interstate business, although such cases are probably very rare. The
patented article is not in itself a commodity of interstate commerce because
it is patented, and does not become subject to the Act of i89o until bought
and sold in the channels of interstate commerce. This principle was over-
looked by Baker, J., in Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Wheel
Co. (1907) i54 Fed. 358 at 362, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 272 at 278, where he said:
"The necessary implication (from the Patent Laws and the Act of i8go) is
that the patented articles, unless or until they are released by the owner of
the patent from the dominion of his monopoly, are not articles of trade or
commerce among the several states." The jurisdiction of the Federal gov-
ernment over patents rests on an express grant in the constitution, and not
on the commerce clause, consequently a patent does not come within the
purview of the power over interstate commerce until the patented article has
been disposed of in the channel of interstate commerce. The owner may
release the article from the dominion of the monopoly without engaging in
interstate commerce.
"For recent cases on this subject, see Henry v. Dick (1912), 224 U. S.
1, 32 Sup. Ct Rep. 364, s6 L. Ed. 645; Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 228 U. S. I,
33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 616, 57 L. Ed. ; Robert H. Ingersoll & Bro. v. McCoU
(1913) 2o4 Fed. 147. See article 1o MICH. LAW REV. 68.
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cloak of a combination of patentees securing the control of the
market, which the rights under their individual patents would
not give them, and which cofitrol would be sufficient to violate
the statute.
The decisions may be considered under the following heads:
(i) where in a suit for infringement or some controversy be-
tween the patentees the invalidity of the combination under the
Act of 189o is set up in defence; (2) where the United States
has proceeded under Section 4 for an injunction against the com-
bination of patentees.6 5
When there is a sale of a patent with a covenant in restraint
of trade by the vendor, the validity of which is drawn into ques-
tion, the case seems to depend on principles relating to covenants
in restraint of trade in general and not to involve any principles
peculiar to patentees.66 We shall first discuss the case of a com-
bination between patentees.
In Indiana Mfg. Co. v. J. L Case Threshing Mach. Co.,67 the
bill was dismissed in the court below on the ground that the plain-
tiff was asking for an injunction to enforce a contract relating to
the use of patents, that the plaintiff had acquired so many patents
that its operations extended beyond a monopoly in the beneficial
use of a specific invention only, and that it intended to create,
in common with many other manufacturers, a monopoly in the
manufacture of the article to which the patents related by secur-
ing and holding all the patents relating thereto. On appeal the de-
cision was reversed, and a decree for the plaintiff entered, the
court saying the case was that of a bill to restrain interference
and infringement and, per Grosscup, J., that the patents all
related to one invention and were blossoms of the same tree.
Baker, J., delivered the opinion of the majority and evidently
went on the ground that since the separate patentees had full
"We have already noticed that the circumstance that the plaintiff is a
member of a combination unlawful under the Act of i8go is no defence to a
third party in a suit for infringement. See n. 29, ante.
"This subject has been discussed under covenants in restraint of trade.
For an instance of such a case see American Brake Beam Co. v. Pungs
(1905), i41 Fed. 923, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 826.
'T (197o) 154 Fed. 365, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 282, reversing (i9o6) 148 Fed.
21, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. ig.
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power over their patents, they must have the same power when
the patents were combined.
In Goshen Rubber Works v. Single Tube Auto. and Bicycle
Tire Co.,68 there was an action by a patentee against a licensee to
recover royalties. The defence was that the agreement was in
restraint of trade and therefore void. The patentee granted vari-
ous licenses of the same patent, and then entered into a restrictive
agreement between the various licensees and itself, agreeing upon
certain royalties, upon which agreement the suit was brought.
Judgment was entered for the plaintiff, the court saying that the
contract was beneficial to the patentee and that the public had no
right to competition between the different licensees, and conse-
quently the modification regulating the sale was valid. The court
also said that the restrictions were like those in the Rubber Tire
Wheel case.
In Bement v. The National Harrow Co.,6 9 the Harrow Com-
pany brought suit on its license contract with one Bement, and the
Supreme Court held that the contract in itself was valid and en-
forceable, there being nothing in the record from which the court
could draw any proper inference as to the existence of other con-
tracts or a combination of manufacturers of spring tooth har-
rows; that the license contract related to a patent conferred by
grant of the United States Government; that the fact that the
conditions in the contract kept up the monopoly or fixed prices
did not render them illegal; that the contract affected interstate
commerce because it called for the manufacture of harrows in
one state and the sale of the product in another state, and that the
contract was not within the Act of 189o.
In Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works
Co.,7 0 the owner of a patent brought an action at law to recover
royalties due under the license system. In the court below judg-
ment was entered for the defendant on the ground that the con-
tracts were void within the Act of 189o because the contracts
" (1908) 166 Fed. 431, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 571.
" (1902) 186 U. S. 70, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 747, 44 L. Ed. 1058, 2 Fed. A. T.
Dec. i69.
10 (igo6) 142 Fed. 531, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 855 (1907), 154 Fed. 358, 3
Fed. A. T. Dec. 272.
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attempted to secure results not contained within or flowing from
the lawful monopoly of the patent, and because the system com-
prised (i) the raising and maintenance of prices and restriction
of interstate trade in circuits where the patent was declared void,
(2) the creation of a fund for crushing out competition through-
out the United States. On appeal, the decision was reversed on
the ground that none of the provisions of the contract touched
any matter outside of the monopoly under the patent. Grosscup,
J., agreed, but took occasion to say that he was not prepared to
hold that patenteed articles are never articles of trade among the
states, within the meaning of the Act of 189o. There was in this
case a requirement that the licensee join the licensor in a combina-
tion or pool to control the output and price of the patented article.
In United States Consolidated Seeded Raisin Co. v. Griff in
& Skelly Co. 7 1 there was litigation over a number of patents be-
tween various claimants, and an agreement was made conveying
the patents to a common owner who was to grant licenses, defend
the patents, each claimant taking the license from him, and the
court held in a suit on the license that the agreement was valid
on the authority of Bement v. National Harrow Co. In this case
all the licenses were in a common form, and defendant was a
party to the combination.
In Blount Mfg. Co. v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co.,7 2 there was
a combination of manufacturers under various patents, each to
restrict his own trade to increase and maintain price, pool profits,
and eliminate competition, which was held void under the Act of
i8go. The case arose on a demurrer to a bill in equity to enforce
the contract, and asking for an accounting in accordance with
the terms of the contract concerning profits arising from the man-
ufacture and sale of the article.
In National Harrow Co. v. Hench,73 a number of manufac-
turers of spring tooth harrows organized a corporation to which
each assigned the patents under which he was operating, and took
(1903) 126 Fed. 264, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 288.
= (igog) 166 Fed. 555, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 575"
"(1W86) 76 Fed. 667, 1 Fed. A. T. Dec. 61o, affirmed in 83 Fed. 36, I
Fed. A. T. Dec. 742, National Harrow Co. v. Hench, 84 Fed. 226, i Fed. A. T.
Dec. 746.
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back an exclusive license to sell the same style of harrows and
no other upon a scale of uniform prices fixed in a schedule. The
combination controlled the sale of 90 per cent. of the spring
tooth harrow business in the United States, and it was held that
the corporation could not enforce the contract in equity, it being
void as in restraint of trade.
No clear principle is laid down in these cases, but it is appre-
hended that the distinction to be drawn' is between individual
action and combined action. The patentee has a monopoly, and
under it is "entitled to restrain trade. The question in any case,
therefore, is whether the restraint arises from the exercise of
rights granted by the letters patent, in which case it is valid, or
whether the restraint arises from the combination of the rights
of several patentees, in which case, if the restraint is, under a
liberal construction of the statute, too great, the combination may
be void. The tendency appears to be to sustain most combina-
tions of patents, proceeding partly upon the erroneous idea that
the patentee has greater power of combination because he is a
patentee, whereas, as we have pointed out, he should have less.
This issue is entirely one of fact.
Only one case has been found of a proceeding by the United
States under Section 4 to enjoin a combination of patentees. In
Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States,74 the defendants
were members of a combination embracing 85 per cent. of the
manufacturers and 90 per cent. of the jobbers in enameled iron-
ware in the United States. It appeared that a certain corpora-
tion had obtained a patent on an improved process of enameling,
and that this company controlled about 50 per cent. of the bus-
iness and steadfastly refused for some time to grant to any other
manufacturer any license to use the patent. The product of the
other manufacturers was inferior in quality, and its sale was said
to hurt the reputation of enameled ironware and generally injure
the business. In this condition of the trade, an individual not
connected with the corporation procured an assignment of the
"4 (1912) 226 U. S. 20, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 9, 57 L. Ed. 9, affirming (I9ii) xgI
Fed. 172, 4 Fed. A. T. Dec. 395.
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patent, as well as several other infringing ones, to himself, and
then brought 85 per cent. of the manufacturers and 90 per cent.
of the jobbers together in an arrangement by which they all took
licenses from him and entered into agreements as to the price at
which the articles should be sold. The agreement eliminated all
competition between the manufacturers and the jobbers. The
court held that the agreements were void under the Act of 189o
because they transcended what was necessary to protect the use
of the patent or the monopoly which the law conferred upon it,
and distinguished this case from the Bement case, because there
there was only one contract involved and here there was a large
number of contracts covering almost the entire market. The
case seemed to go on the ground that the whole agreement was
for the purpose of elimination of competition and used the pat-
ent as a cloak for the purpose. The question is, after all, one of
fact, and it is probable that the circumstance in this case that an
individual interjected himself into the situation and procured
the patents and arranged the contrivance, was an important ele-
ment in influencing the court in reaching the decision it did. If
the corporation controlling the patent had itself made these ar-
rangements, a different result might have been reached.
There is no reason to suppose that the rule is different in the
case of proceedings by the United States from that applicable in
the case of proceedings between the parties, and the question is
the same in all cases,-does the control over the market arise
merely from the patent rights or from the power of the combina-
tion?
LABOR UNIONS.
Labor unions seem to require separate treatment, as they
involve several forms of restraint of trade, which may be speci-
fied as follows: (I) The laborers, by combining, may effect a
monopoly in the sale of their labor and deprive the employer of a
free labor market, thereby producing a state of affairs with respect
to the sale of labor directly condemned by the act, and in no wise
to be distinguished from a monopoly by sellers or manufacturers
of any particular product, as, for instance, petroleum or tobacco.
(2) The members of the union may, by use of force, threats,
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and persuasion against other employees of their employer
who are not members of the union, compel the latter to leave
work. In this case they induce a third party to break the con-
tract with the employer, and the question of how far the action of
inducing a third party to break a contract is an actionable wrong
is one on which there is considerable law, and which seems to be
fully covered by the common law. It is doubtful whether it is
within the provisions of the act. (3) By a boycott the members
of the union may injure the sale of their employer's goods or
diminish his business by driving away customers, that is, prevent-
ing others from dealing with him. (4) The employees of a rail-
road company engaged in interstate transportation may, by a
strike, cause a suspension of the operations of the railroad, and
thus prevent the free flow of commerce between the states. This
is the form of restraint of trade by a labor union which has per-
haps attracted the most attention.
We may summarize these, four forms as follows: (i)
monopoly of the selling of labor; (2) action upon other em-
ployees inducing them to break their contract; (3) damage to
the employer's business by driving away customers; (4) com-
bination of employees preventing employer from fulfilling its
public duty. The chief evil to the employer under the first form
is the necessity of his paying a high price for labor, perhaps an
excessive price, and a restraint on his freedom in the purchase 6f
labor. This restraint, of course, is the same as the restraint on
any other purchaser, but the employer seems to have very little
sympathy from the public on this score, and his plight in this con-
nection attracts very little attention. It was earnestly contended
that labor unions, that is, combinations of laboring men were
not subject to the provisions of the Act of 189o. It seems per-
fectly clear, however, and it has been so decided in a number of
cases, that every such combination is subject to this provision
just as any other combination in restraint of trade.75 In a num-
'Labor unions have been held subject to equity proceedings by the
United States under §4 in the following cases: U. S. v. Workingmen's Amal-
gamated Council of New Orleans, et al. (1893), 54 Fed. g4, i Fed. A. T. Dec.
iio, affirmed in 57 Fed. 85, 1 Fed. A. T. Dec. 184; in this case an injunction
was issued against a general and sympathetic strike of a number of labor
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ber- of proceedings independently of the statute, the provisions
of the act have been applied to a combination of laborers.
70
Only one case has arisen of a proceeding under Section 7.
The same principle, of course, applies, and a labor union is no
more exempt from liability from such a suit than is any other
combination. The only reason that such suits are not brought
oftener is that the defendants in such cases are usually unable
to respond in damages. The question as to this remedy arose in
the case of Loewe v. Lawlor, commonly referred to as the Dan-
bury Hatters Case, 77 in which there was an action for treble dam-
unions in New Orleans, paralyzing business and interfering with the flow of
commerce through the city. Warehousemen had refused to acknowledge the
union of their employees or to employ none but union men. U. S. v. Elliott
(1894), 62 Fed. 8oi, I Fed. A. T. Dec. 262. Preliminary injunction issued, 64
Fed. 27, I Fed. A. T. Dec. 311, demurrer overruled; injunction issued against
strike by the employees of an interstate railroad. U. S. v. Debs (1894), 64
Fed. 724, 1 Fed. A. T. Dec. 322. Proceedings for contempt. Same case In re
Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (1894), 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90, 39 L. Ed. io92, i Fed. A. T.
Dec. 565. Principal discussion in this case was as to the jurisdiction of a
cou-t of equity to issue an injunction. Decision below affirmed in the Su-
preme Court without resting on the provisions of the Anti-Trust Act. See
also U. S. v. Agler (1894), 62 Fed. 824, 1 Fed. A. T. Dec. 294; In re Grand
Jury (1894), 62 Fed. 84o, i Fed. A. T. Dec. 301.
" Thomas v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co. (1894) 62 Fed. 803, I
Fed. A. T. Dec. 266; the employees of a railroad under the management of
a receiver refused to haul Pullman cars until the Pullman Company had
acceded to the demands of its striking employees, and the court issued an
injunction restraining the sympathetic strike of the employees of the railroad
company in this particular. Waterhouse, et al., v. Cover (1893), 55 Fed.
149, 1 Fed. A. T. Dec. i1g; in this case it was decided that a rule of the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers forbidding a member of the Brother-
hood from hauling cars of a railroad company on which the engineers be-
longing to the Brotherhood are on a strike, is in restraint of interstate
commerce, and consequently the receiver of a railroad company will not,
unless the rule is abrogated, be authorized to enter into an agreement with
the officers of the Brotherhood. In this case the Brotherhood submitted to
the court the question of the validity of the rule, the proceedings arising in a
petition for an order on the receiver to enter into the contract with them.
Where a labor union threatens a strike unless a certain brewer will join
an association of brewers, which is formed for the purpose of raising the
price of the product and apportioning the sales, a retail dealer who had been
in profitable relations with an independent brewer was allowed an injunction
against the union because if the brewer yielded to the threat of a strike and
joined the association, the retail dealer would be irreparably injured and his
profitable relations with the brewer at an end. Leonard v. Abner-Drury
Brewing Co. (igo5) 25 Appeal (D. C.) Cases, 161; 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. i.
(1907) 208 U. S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 301, 52 L. Ed. 488, 3 Fed. A.
T. Dec. 324, reversing (19o6) 148 Fed. 924, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 41, overruling
demurrer, see 142 Fed. 216, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 854,. 13o Fed. 633, 2 Fed. A. T.
Dec. 563, on subsequent trial, plaintiff recovered a verdict for $232,240.32,
which was reversed in 187 Fed. 522, 4 Fed. A. T. Dec. 264, for certain errors
at the trial.
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ages. The plaintiffs were manufacturers of hats in Danbury,
Connecticut, selling their product throughout the United States.
Defendants were a union of workmen in hats existing throughout
the United States, and were seeking, by striking and by declaring
a boycott against the plaintiffs' goods, to force the plaintiffs to
accede to the demands that plaintiffs' shops should be conducted
in accordance with the rules of the union. The defendants de-
murred to the plaintiffs' statement, and the Supreme Court held
that the demurrer should be overruled, saying that it was imma-
terial that the defendants were not themselves engaged in inter-
state business.
REMEDY UNDER SECTION 7.
Section 7 gives an action at law for treble damages to any
person who is injured in his business or property by any other
person or corporation by reason of any thing forbidden or de-
clared to be unlawful by the act, that is, by the first and second
sections. 78 We must therefore examine the first and second sec-
tions to ascertain what is forbidden, and then see who is or may
be injured by the doing of the unlawful act. The discussion of
this section may be conveniently arranged under the following
headings: (I) competition which may be fair or unfair; (2)
purchaser against combination; (3) combinations of retailers,
wholesalers and manufacturers; (4) refusal to trade; (5) coven-
ants in restraint of trade.79  A tabular analysis of the first,
second, seventh and eighth sections is appended in the note.80
The important question is whether there is only a right of
action for acts which come within the common law conception
of unfair competition or whether other acts of competition may
be complained of. The authorities give us no answer to this
"Virtue, et al., v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co. (1913) 227 U. S.8, 33
Sup. Ct. Rep. 202, 57 L. Ed. 202, affirming T79 Fed. 115, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec.
794; Monarch Tobacco Works v. American Tobacco Co. (r9o8) 165 Fed. 774,
3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 534; Peoples Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co. (i9o9)
17o Fed. 396, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 66o; Dueber Watch Case Co. v. Howard
Watch Co. (893) 5s Fed. 851, i Fed. A. T. Dec. 178, 66 Fed. 637, r Fed.
A. T. Dec. 42r.
"The bearing of this section on combinations of carriers and labor
unions is elsewhere discussed.
"TABULAR ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST, SECOND, SEVENTH AND EIGHTH SECTIONS.
(See Table on Next Page.)
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question."' It was contended in one case, 2 without approval,
however, by the court, that Section 7 gives a right of action only
where a violation of the preceding sections results in legal injury
to the plaintiff at common law.
It is perfectly plain that the act cannot give a right of action
for every act of competition without discouraging the very free-
dom of trade and opportunity for competition which it is the
obvious object of the statute to promote. Yet this is what the
statute does, if literally interpreted, because the second section
condemns as unlawful every attempt to monopolize; and since
an attempt to monopolize describes the normal effort of every
active successful business man, it follows thai his competitors
might sue him for damages caused by his successful competition,
Things forbidden by § I.
[Contract
Combination in the
Every form of trust or
otherwise
Conspiracy
Persons restrained who may be in-
jured and sue under § 7.
Covenantor
Covenantee
Third persons
Competitors of covenantor
i Persons buying from or sellingin retrait of to the covenantee
interstate Competitors of the combination
trade, etc. Persons buying from or selling to
the combination
The members of the combination
Same as in case of combination
Section 2.
Monopolize
Any part of
Attempt to - interstate
monopolize I trade
Combine or
conspire with
any other
person or
corporation
to monopolize
Competitors of the monopoly
Persons buying from or sell-
ing to the monopoly
Members of the monopoly
Competitors
Persons buying from or sell-
ing to the attempted mon-
opoly not injured since no
monopoly achieved
Competitors
Persons buying from or sell-
ing to the monopoly if
achieved
Members of the combination
" See remarks of Connor, J., in Ware-Kramer Tob. Co. v. American
Tobacco Co. (igio) i8o Fed: i6o at I65, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 78o at 787.
' Wheeler-Stenzel Co. v. National Window Glass Jobbers' Assn. (Io7)
1&5 Fed. 864, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 208.
Every I
Person
Corporation
(by Sec. 8)
who shall
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whether fair or unfair. No case has arisen as to this point, and
our discussion of the decided cases will therefore be confined to
competition by a combination. The difficulty with this part of
the law is that the competitive power of combination is so much
greater than that of an individual that the opportunity for acts
of unfair competition are greater, and consequently the common
law needs considerable expansion.
We have already pointed out that at common law combina-
tions which unlawfully restrain trade could operate with im-
punity so far as third parties were concerned, as no question as
to the validity of the combination could come before the court
until one of the members sought to enforce the terms of the com-
bination against. another. This section of the statute was prob-
ably intended to give a remedy for this state of affairs.
In Virtue v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co.,8 the plaintiff, a
manufacturing company, brought a suit under Section 7 against
a combination of competitors, several of whom owned patents,
and complained of the following acts: (i) prosecution against
plaintiff by the defendants of two infringement suits, one of
which resulted in a decree for a plaintiff and reference for an
accounting; (2) circulation in the market of reports that plain-
tiff's product was an infringement of defendant's patents; and
the court held there could be no recovery on either.ground. The
plaintiff also alleged that one of the defendants, who was the
plaintiff in one of the infringement suits was a party to an un-
lawful combination, and the court said that, conceding that to be
so, it had the right to sue, and could not, therefore, be held liable
in an action of damages for bringing suit. One of the parties
defendant had been constituted the sole selling agent of a cor-
poration which had been one of the plaintiffs in one of the afore-
said infringement suits, which contract was held to be perfectly
valid and not obnoxious to the Act of 189o. The Supreme Court
went on the ground that the combination alleged was not proved,
although one of the corporate defendants might in itself consti-
s (1913) 227 U. S. 8, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 202, 57 L. Ed. 202, affirming (igio)
179 Fed. 115, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 794.
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tute an unlawful combination under the act. The legality of the
acts of competition alleged was not, therefore, passed upon.
8 4 "
In Monarch Tobacco Works v. American Tobacco Co.,85 the
plaintiff, a corporation, sued several defendants, alleging a con-
spiracy to restrain trade, averring (i) secretly acquiring control
of a hostile competing corporation, and falsely pretending that
the said corporation remained independent; (2) secretly acquir-
ing control of a box company with which the plaintiff had a
secret contract for the production of boxes, thereby acquiring a
material knowledge of the plaintiff's affairs, and thereby ascer-
taining how many boxes the plaintiff required for its business.
Demurrer to the complaint was overruled.
In People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co.,8s the
complaint which was held to constitute a good cause of action set
6ut that the plaintiff corporation was engaged in interstate busi-
ness and that the several defendant corporations were guilty of
the following acts: (i) Enticing away plaintiff's workmen; (2)
by false pretences to labor union receiving right to use union
label; (3) enticing away plaintiff's customers; (4) issuing cou-
pons and premiums to purchasers, drawing away trade from
plaintiff and compelling plaintiff to do the same (plaintiff claimed
special item of .damages for this); (5) secretly buying up rival
companies, and particularly sellers of raw product, and causing
them to discriminate against plaintiff; (6) paying consideration to
retailers not to handle plaintiff's goods; (7) bidding up tobacco
and compelling plaintiff to pay more for raw material; (8) organ-
izing a dummy competing corporation.
In Ware Kramer Tobacco Co. et al. v. American Tobacco
Co. et al.,87 the plaintiff by its amended complaint, demurrer to
which was overruled, set out that the defendants, being an unlaw-
ful combination within the terms of the statute, (i) resorted to
"The opinion of McKenna, J., is somewhat obscure. He refers to the
Owatonna Company, but as there were two companies of that name, one
plaintiff and the other defendant, it is not perfectly clear which he has in
mind.
0 (i9o8) 165 Fed. 774, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 534.
" (19o9) 170 Fed. 396, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 66o.
" (191o) 178 Fed. 117, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 766, demurrer to complaint sus-
tained; and (igiO) i8o Fed. 16o, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 78o, demurrer to amended
complaint overruled.
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unfair and coercive means to prevent the organization of the
plaintiff company. (2) That one of defendant's managing
officers threatened the persons proposing to organize the plain-
tiff company that, by fair means or foul, the defendant would
destroy it. (3) That stockholders or prospective stockholders of
the plaintiff company (afterwards organized) were threatened
by officers of the defendants that the American Tobacco Company
would take away from such persons the sale of its products. (4)
That an officer in a bank was threatened by one of defendants
that if he participated in the organization, his business would be
made to suffer. (5) That persons from whom plaintiff bought
raw product were threatened with injury to business. (6) That
one of the incorporators of the plaintiff company was offered that
if plaintiff would surrender its charter, all expenses incurred
would be paid. (7) That false and unjust statements were cir-
culated by defendants in regard to plaintiff's business and goods.
(8) That the defendants (a) maintained spies upon plaintiff's
shippers, and sent their representatives to customers so ascer-
tained; (b) used coupons in an unfair manner; (c) sold cigar-
ettes below cost of production; (d) paid jobbers extra discounts
in territory where plaintiff's cigarettes were selling, giving job-
bers free goods to induce them to press the sale of their goods
as against the plaintiff; (e) required dealers not to handle plain-
tiff's goods; (f) interfered with the labor of independent man-
ufacturers; (g) made jobbers and dealers afraid to keep plain-
tiff's goods exposed on their shelves. (9) That a large order
from China to plaintiff for cigarettes was discovered by the de-
fendants through their spies, and the defendants through their
efforts shut the plaintiff out of that market. (io) That the de-
fendants procured a representative to be employed as manager
of the plaintiff's sales department, who so managed the sales
department of the plaintiff's business as to greatly injure and
decrease it, acting in the interests of the defendants.
In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,88 the plaintiff,
Is (i9o6) 203 U. S. 390, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65, 51 L. Ed. 24T, 3 Fed. A. T.
Dec. 648, affirming i66 Fed. 26r, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 563, i6o Fed. 184, 3 Fed.
A. T. Dec. 372, 153 Fed. 943, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 262.
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a corporation under the laws of Alabama, brought suit against
the defendant for acts of competition, which were set out as fol-
lows: (i) Instigating the officers of a foreign government to
seize a plantation of plaintiff situate therein and preventing plain-
tiff from exporting bananas therefrom to the United States.3 9
(2) Outbidding plaintiff by securing long term contracts with
producers of bananas in foreign countries. (3) Defendant estab-
lishing a transportation line between the United States and the
said foreign countries, which line, at the behest of defendant, dis-
criminated against the plaintiff. (4) Enticing away plaintiff's em-
ployees. (5) Threatening to discharge from its own services
such of its workmen as became financially interested in the plain-
tiff's enterprise. The court held that there could be no recovery.
In one case, where the plaintiff was prevented from operat-
ing a refinery which was built, its right to recover was sustained. 0
So much therefore of the decision in American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co.,9 that the act gives no right of action to one
who is merely prevented from embarking on a new enterprise
by the threatening aspect of an already existing monopoly or
combination, may probably be disregarded.
No clear principle can be drawn from these cases. Numer-
ous different acts, some of them clear common law torts, have
been complained of and the courts have generally disposed of
the case on the complaint as a whole, without distinguishing the
difference, if any, in the various acts of the defendant. Conse-
quently it is impossible to clearly point out which acts are valid
under the act, and as many of them clearly seem to be valid, the
invalid ones cannot be distinguished sufficiently to lay down any
rule. On the whole, we shall have to leave this branch of the sub-
ject in some obscurity until a greater accumulation of decided
cases has furnished an opportunity to give some shape to the law.
It may be concluded, however, that the remedy furnished by Sec-
0 As to this see note 6, ante.
" Penna. Sugar Refining Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co. (igo8) i6o
Fed. 144, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 369, where complaint was dismissed, which was
reversed in (i9o8) 166 Fed. 254, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 552.
ft (igo8) i6o Fed. 184, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 372.
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tion 7 goes beyond the limits of the common law remedy for un-
fair competition.
BUYER OR SELLER AGAINST THE COMBINATION.
The person buying or selling the particular commodity is
injured when the combination restrains the freedom of the buy-
ing or selling, which restraint may affect the price, quality, etc.,
of the article. All the cases which have arisen have turned on the
element of price, and in nearly every case the purchaser has been
complaining. Our discussion of the authorities, therefore, will
be limited to these cases. The law seems to be that the pur-
chaser is entitled to a price fixed by free competition, or per-
haps a reasonable price, and that he is entitled to recover as
damages the difference between that and the price paid. It does
not follow, however, that he is entitled to compel the combina-
tion to sell to him at a reasonable price, or that the law will, ex-
cept in the case of public service corporations, fix a price and
compel a sale.02  Even the broad language of the Act of 189o
does not cover this point because its terms only condemn contracts
and the making of certain contracts, and do not extend to the
compulsory formation of a contract.
The leading case on this subject is Chattanooga Foundry
Pipe Works v. Atlanta,93 where the plaintiff, who had bought
from the combination declared unlawful in Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co. v. United States,9 4 was held entitled to recover the dif-
ference between the price which he paid and a fair or reasonable
price. Holmes, J., who delivered the opinion in this case, said 95
"the transaction which did the wrong was a transaction between
parties in different states if that be material." The bearing of the
phrase "if that be material" is obscure. It may be gathered from
' The same rule would apply to a seller who is compelled by the combi-
nation of buyers to sell at a price below that fixed by free competition.
'3 (1906) 203 U. S. 390, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65, 51 L. Ed. 241, 3 Fed. A. T.
Dec. 113, affirming 127 Fed. 23, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 299, which reversed ioi
Fed. 9oo, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. ii.
" (899) 175 U. S. 211, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 96, 44 L. Ed. 136, i Fed. A. T.
Dec. oog, affirming 85 Fed. 271, i Fed. A. T. Dec. 772, 78 Fed. 712, i Fed. A.
T. Dec. 631.
'Page 396 of the official report, and ixg of the Fed. A. T. Dec.
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it that the learned judge thinks that it is not necessary for the
sale to be an interstate sale. It is difficult, however, to see how
the plaintiff can come within the scope of the act unless his trade
with persons in another state has been restrained. It might be
said that the combination, by acting upon purchases and sales
between different states, so affected the price that a purchase by
a resident of a state from somebody in that state, would neces-
sarily be at a price brought about by the combination.96 There
is also some doubt as to what the learned judge means by
"the transaction which did the wrong." Does he refer to
the act of combining among the defendants or to a sale at the
enhanced price? It may perhaps be assumed that he meant the
latter in view of a subsequent passage in the opinion, where he
says that the fact that the sale was not so connected in its terms
with the unlawful combination as to be unlawful, in no way con-
tradicts the proposition that the motives and inducements to
make it were so affected by the combination as to constitute a
wrong. It is apprehended that the true principle is this: the
wrongful act is the combination, the act of combining, and that
act of rombining, when it deprives the purchaser of his freedom
in buying, produces as a result a sale of the commodity at an
enhanced price. It will appear, therefore, upon reflection that the
sale is the result of the wrongful act, and not the wrongful act
itself, and that the motives and inducements to make the sale are
immaterial. Furthermore, the learned judge admits the damage
to the plaintiff is the difference between the enhanced price which
he pays and a price fixed by competition. This enhanced price,
however, is part of the consideration of the sale, an element in
"No case on this point has been found. In Montague v. Lowry (1904),
193 U. S. 38, 24 Sup. Ct. 307, 48 L. Ed. 6o8, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 327, affirming
15 Fed. 27, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 112, which affirmed Io6 Fed. 38, 2 Fed. A. T.
Dec. 53, see 98 Fed. 817, I Fed. A. T. Dec. 995, where the demurrer was over-
ruled, the jenhancement of the intra-state price was said to be part of the
purpose of the interstate combination, and the plaintiff who was compelled
to pay that excess price was entitled to recover it, but in this case the plain-
tiff was prevented from buying in the channels of interstate trade. A restraint
as to interstate business may, it seems, be void notwithstanding a negligible
amount of intra-state business might be affected in carrying it out. See
remarks of Fuller, J., in Loewe v. Lawler (i9o8), 208 U. S. 274 at 301, 28
Sup. Ct. Rep. 301, 52 L. Ed. 488, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 324 at 350. Confer, Ellis
v. Inman Poulson & Co., et al., 131 Fed. 182, 2 Fed. A.. T. Dec. 577, reversing
124 Fed. 956, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 268.
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it, and if the sale itself is the wrongful act, how can an element
in the wrongful act be the damage to the plaintiff ?
In Thomson v. The Union Castle Mail S. S. Co.,97 there
was an action at law for treble damages under Section 7. A
combination of ship owners issued a circular promising rebates
to shippers who did not patronize competing vessels. A shipper
did so patronize, and the defendants refused to pay him any
more rebates. It was held in the court below that the plaintiff's
claim to the rebates, if any, was not an item of damages that
grew out of the combination of ship owners, and hence plaintiff
could not recover. On appeal, however,98 the decision was re-
versed and a new trial ordered, the court saying that the com-
bination charged a sum in excess of reasonable rates which the
plaintiffs were entitled to recover since they were coerced into
paying that amount. There was nothing in the report, however,
to show that the rebate was in excess of a reasonable rate, and
it is difficult to see how the court reached such a conclusion. 99
In one case, 10 however, where a combination sold goods
under a contract to pay rebates to such purchasers as observed the
restrictions imposed as to the purchase of the goods, it was held
that the payment of the price exacted was voluntary, and when
the combination went into the hands of a receiver, the purchaser
could not recover the amount of the rebates out of the bankrupt
estate. The court laid down the principle that the purchaser who
had bought and paid for the goods at the enhanced price could not
retain the goods and recover the price paid or any part of it.
This case seems inconsistent with the others and may be dis-
regarded unless it is explained on the ground that the recovery
of the rebates would give an unfair preference as against the
other creditors.
It seems perfectly clear under the cases that a purchaser
who has been compelled to pay an enhanced price brought about
(i9o7) i49 Fed. 933, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. io8.
"(i9o8) 166 Fed. 251, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. s48.
"In several other cases the right of the purchaser to recover the excess
price was sustained. U. S. Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., et at.
(19o8), 163 Fed. 701, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 410; Weisert Bros. Tobacco Co. v.
American Tobacco Co. (iqo8) 163 Fed. 712, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 426.
' Dennehy v. McNulta (1898), 86 Fed. 825, 1 Fed. A. T. Dec. 855.
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by the unlawful combination may recover the difference between
that price and a price which would have obtained without the
operations of the combination.
COMBINATION. OF RETAILERS, WHOLESALERS AND
MANUFACTURERS.
A retailer is, in one aspect of a case, a competitor of a whole-
saler, and as at the same time as he buys from him, the two stand
in the relation of buyer and seller. So also a manufacturer or a
wholesaler is a competitor of the retail dealer and also sells to
him. The competitioh in this branch of trade seems to be very
intense in the modern business world, and restrictive agreements
are of very frequent occurrence.' 0 '
The cases amply sustain the principle that where a combina-
tion of manufacturers ana wholesalers or retailers is sufficiently
strong to restrain the freedom of the trade of the retailer and
prevent him from dealing in that particular commodity, the
retailer may sue under Section 7. So also a manufacturer or a
wholesaler who is restricted by a combination of retailers, and
wholesalers or other manufacturers and shut out from a portion
of his market, may in like manner recover treble damages under
the act.
In United States v. Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers
Assn.,0la an association of retail dealers issued a circular among
themselves designed to assist in preventing wholesale dealers from
dealing directly with the customers. On proceedings by the
United States an injunction was issued against the issuance of
the circular on the ground that the circulation of the report dis-
couraged competition by the wholesalers. The court did not
inquire into whether the business of the wholesalers was unduly
restrained, which it should have done, if the Supreme Court de-
cisions in favor of a liberal construction of the act are to be
followed. It is apprehended that the decision is open to objec-
tion on this ground. The cases arising between the parties are
as follows:
The case of the manufacturer is separately discussed in a subsequent
portion of this article.
'*a (19J2) 201 Fed. 58i.
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In Mines v. Scribner et al.,10 2 the members of a combination
of booksellers who agreed not to sell copyrighted books to any
one who sold below the list price were held liable to plaintiff,
who was on the blacklist as having sold below the fixed price and
could not buy. Demurrer to complaint overruled °.' 0 3
In Hale v. O'Conner Coal & Supply Co., Inc.,10 4 the plain-
tiff brought an action under Section 7, and his complaint was
held sufficient on demurrer. The plaintiff was a retail coal dealer,
and sued a combination of other dealers who formed an exchange
for maintaining prices, and because plaintiff would not main-
tain the prices, excluded him from obtaining coal, and circulated
false and malicious reports as to plaintiff's standing. This case
decides that one retail dealer may recover damages from a com-
bination of dealers who interfere with his procuring supplies
from wholesalers and circulate false reports about him.
In Montague v. Lowry °,' 5 certain wholesale dealers in San
Francisco entered into an agreement of exclusive buying and
selling with all the manufacturers in the United States in a par-
ticular commodity by which the wholesale dealers agreed to
charge double prices to those not members of the association, and
the manufacturers agreed not to sell to them. It was held that
the combination between the dealers and manufacturers was so
bound together that the enhancement of price in California was
part of the purpose and the plaintiff was entitled to recover treble
damages under Section 7. The manufacturers in several states
had refused to sell to him because he was not a member of
the association, and consequently he had been compelled to pro-
cure tiles at the excess price from the dealers.
In Wheeler-Stenzel Co. v. Nat. Window Glass Assn.,'06 a
"02 (i9o6) 147 Fed. 927, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. lO35. It does not appear
exactly what damages were claimed.
103 Of course, the publisher of a book is, in a sense, the manufacturer,
and the seller of a manufactured product, and his case, therefore, is the
same as that hereafter discussed of a manufacturer and the sale of his
product.
104 (i9o8) 181 Fed. 267, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 8o6.
' (19o4) 193 U. S. 38, 24 Sup. Ct. 307, 48 L. Ed. 6o8, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec.
327, affirming 115 Fed. 27, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 112, which affirmed io6 Fed.
38, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 53; see 98 Fed. 817, I Fed. A. T. Dec. 995, where the
demurrer was overruled.
'"(907) 152 Fed. 864, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 208,
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manufacturer of glass and an association of wholesale dealers
entered into an agreement-by which the manufacturer was to
sell exclusively to the association at a fixed price and charge a
higher price to others. The combination controlled 75 per cent.
of the buying and selling, and it was held that the plaintiff, an
outsider, had a right of action under Section 7, and demurrer to
his complaint was overruled. The plaintiff alleged that the com-
bination deprived him of customers and prevented him from
making a legitimate profit upon the customers which he retained.
In Loder v. Jayne,107 a retail dealer who refused to sell
according to the list price fixed by the combination of manufac-
turers and retail and wholesale dealers, was allowed to recover
against members of the combination, who, in consequence, had
refused to sell to him direct, as a result of which he was compelled
to procure the drugs from individual retail dealers and at a
greater price than in the regular way.
In Dueber Watch Case Mfg. Co. v. E. Howard Watch &
Clock Co. et al.,10 8 the plaintiff, a manufacturer of watch cases,
sued the defendants, manufacturers and sellers of watch cases,
who combined and agreed not to sell to any person who should
thereafter buy or sell any goods manufactured by the plaintiff,
and in consequence plaintiff lost a great deal of business. The
defendants had entered into an agreement for the purpose of
maintaining a fixed price for their goods. It was held he could
not recover. The court said that the allegations did not preclude
the inference that defendant sold its entire product in the state
where it was manufactured, and there was nothing to show that
the defendant did include all or substantially all the manufac-
turers of watch cases, and as the article was not of prime neces-
sity, there was no objection to the defendant removing compe-
tition among themselves. Wallace, J., dissented on the ground
that as the combination of the defendants was designed to compel
the plaintiff to join in the compact to maintain an arbitrary scale
"I (i9o6) 142 Fed. 1Oa, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 976, reversed as to damages,
Jayne v. Loder (i9o6), 149 Fed. 21, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 65.
10 (i895) 66 Fed. 637, I Fed. A. T. Dec. 421, affirming 55 Fed. 851, i
Fed. A. T. Dec. 178, which sustained demurrer; see Hate v. Hatch and North
Coal Co. (1913) 204 Fed. 433.
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of prices, and necessarily resulted in depriving dealers in many
states of the untrammeled exercise of their right to buy from
the plaintiff and was therefore unlawful, that no combination is
justified in combining to compel a competing manufacturer to
join them and destroy his business if he refuses to do so.
REFUSAL TO TRADE.
The law does not favor compelling an individual to sell at
a certain price or to a particular person. Generally speaking, each
seller may, except in case of public service corporations, refuse
to sell to any person and fix his own price or terms of sale. Any
other principle would seriously circumscribe the very freedom
of trade which the law is striving to maintain. While this prin-
ciple held good at common law, so far as individual action was
concerned, the law was otherwise when a number of traders'
joined together in refusing to trade with a particular person.
The most that the common law could do in such a case was to
refuse to enforce the terms of the combination as amongst its
members in a suit between them. If we adopt a liberal construc-
tion of the statute, the same principle will be observed except that
under Section 7 there is the additional remedy which the party
refused may pursue against the combination.
The distinction between rights of individuals to refuse to
trade, and the right of the member of a combination to refuse
to trade was referred to in one case, 10 9 and in another case, which
may be referred to the heading of individual action, the plaintiff
refused was denied a right to sue under this section.110 In
'"Archibald, J., in Jayne v. Loder (i9o6), 149 Fed. 21 at 27, 3 Fed. A. T.
Dec. 65 at 74. In Anderson v. U. S. (898) 171 U. S. 604 at 611, ig Sup. Ct.
Rep. 50, 43 L. Ed. 300, I Fed. A. T. Dec. 967 at 905, see 82 Fed. 998, i Fe&
A. T. Dec. 742, Peckham, J., said that the mere refusal to do business is not
a violation of the Federal statute. The learned judge did not refer to the
distinction between refusal by an individual and refusal by a combination.
" Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co. (19o3) 125 Fed. 454, 2 Fed. A. T.
Dec. 271. In this case a corporation refused to sell its tobacco products to
anyone who bought from a competitor, and it was held that no action lay
under §7 by a middleman who declined to refuse to buy from competitors,
demurrer to complaint being sustained. The corporation owned certain
brands and had a monopoly, and the plaintiff was unable to procure those
goods elsewhere. It was not an article of prime necessity. Defendant in-
tended to and did acquire a monopoly in sale of goods of their brand.
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other cases, where a combination refused to trade with the
plaintiff, he was permitted to -recover treble damages under this
section.1 1
COVENANTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE.
The effect of Section 7 on the case of contracts of sale in
restraint of trade is uncertain. There are several persons con-
cerned. The covenantee is injured by the non-performance of
the covenant, but as he is only entitled to enforce when the cov-
enant is valid and .may avail himself of the invalidity of the
covenant when sued by the covenantee for non-performance, and
as the right of recovery given by the act cannot be used by way
of set-off, he does not seem to come within the provisions of
the section. The covenantor may perhaps enforce the covenant
when it is invalid and the covenantee is without a remedy.
The question then is, may the suit be brought under this
section? No case has arisen as to this. The competitor of the
covenantor, however, is benefited by the performance of the cov-
enant because in that case one competitor is removed. It seems,
therefore, as if the only person really injured is the buyer or
seller of the covenantee, and the question arises against whom
shall he bring suit-the covenantor or the covenantee? An in-
nocent covenantor, in the case of a covenantee taking contracts
to cover the market, should not be liable, as we have seen that he
is probably at common law not affected with the illegality of the
contract. The covenantee, however, is always a guilty party and
rIn Ellis v. Inman Poulson & Co. (1904) i3I Fed. 182, 2 Fed. A. T.
Dec. 577, reversing (1903) 124 Fed. 956, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 268, a combination
of lumber manufacturers raised the price of lumber in Portland, and refused
to sell to anyone who bought lumber from competitors, and it was held that
the outside dealers could recover in an action under §7 because his trade in
dealing with the outside dealers was restrained. The case of the Arkansas
Brokerage Co., et al., v. Dunn & Powell, Inc. (909) 173 Fed. 899, 3 Fed.
A. T. Dec. 752, was an action for damages under §7. The plaintiff, a broker,
brought suit against a number of jobbers who had organized a corporation
to do their own brokerage business, purchasing from manufacturers and
jobbers in other states, and which corporation did practically all of the
wholesale business of the locality. Some of these jobbers had theretofore
done business with the plaintiff, and it was held that he could not recover,
even though he was forced to withdraw from business in that locality. The
case, however, proceeded on the ground that the combination did not affect
interstate commerce, and the court also seemed to think that the combina-
tion was valid, anihow.
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should be liable, and where the covenantor participates in the
intent or effort to control the buying and selling, he also should
be liable. The question then arises, are they jointly and severally
liable or only severally liable? The authorities furnish no an-
swer to the question.
It seems clear that as between the members of a combination
neither can sue the other under Section 7 for treble damages for
the restraint imposed by the combination. No man can enter
into an unlawful scheme and then enforce as against a partner
in the transaction the penalties prescribed by the act.
112
Roland R. Foulke.
Philadelphia.
(To be concluded.)
. Where the plaintiff enters into the agreement forming the trust, and
has been sued by the trust for alleged failure on his part to observe the terms
of the agreement, he cannot recover under §7 for damages caused by the
bringing of the suit at law, Bishop v. American Preservers Co., et al. (Igoo),
io5 Fed. 845, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 5I, see 5I Fed. 272, I Fed. A. T. Dec. 49.
